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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1963.

No. 918

EVANSTON CAB CO., a corporation; SKOKIE RED TOP CAB CO., a corporation; LINCOLNWOOD RED TOP CAB CO., a corporation;

Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation; YELLOW CAB CO., a corporation; CHECKER TAXI CO., INC., a corporation; FLASH CAB CO., a corporation; PUBLIC TAXI SERVICE, INC., a corporation; ABERNATHY TAXI ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation; SOUTH SIDE CAB CO., a corporation; HIGHLAND CAB COMPANY, INC., a corporation; COMMERCIAL CAB CO., a corporation; BERTEL W. DAIGRE; AMERICAN UNITED CAB ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association; JACK TAYLOR, individually and as President of the Defendant American United Cab Association; PETE BARBERO, individually and as Secretary of the Defendant American United Cab Association; JOHN C. MELANIPHY; JAMES Y. CARTER; RAY SIMON; and THOMAS J. COONEY,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENTS, CITY OF CHICAGO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, JOHN C. MELANIPHY, JAMES Y. CARTER, RAY SIMON AND THOMAS J. COONEY.

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BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENTS, CITY OF CHICAGO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, JOHN C. MELANIPHY, JAMES Y. CARTER, RAY SIMON AND THOMAS J. COONEY.

Opinions Below.

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reported at 325 F. 2d 907.

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional requisites are adequately set forth in the Petition.

Questions Presented.

In the court below, and in this Court, we have taken issue with petitioners' summarization of the questions presented. Insofar as these respondents are concerned, these are the questions presented:

1. Where the legislative body enacts a law which allegedly contravenes constitutional provisions, must the municipality (or the State or the Federal Government) respond in damages to persons affected by such a law or are such persons limited in their remedy to a suit asking that the law be declared invalid?
2. Does taxicab service provided locally for those arriving at or departing from an airport have a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce so that federal antitrust jurisdiction may be invoked?
3. Is an ordinance lawfully adopted by a municipal legislative body providing for the licensing of taxicabs subject to antitrust action by taxicab companies operating in another municipality?
4. Does discussion of contemplated legislation violate antitrust laws?
5. Is the Chicago taxicab licensing ordinance constitutional?
6. Are municipal corporations or municipal officials liable under antitrust laws?

Petitioners inject statements of fact into their presentation of the questions presented which are not supported by the record. For example in the petition they assert (p. 2) there is a stoppage or other restraint of taxicab service which causes a substantial interruption to or inter-

ference with the free flow of commerce. This gratuitous conclusion is a figment of petitioners' imagination. In their complaint and in their petition filed in this Court petitioners have indulged in numerous conclusions unsubstantiated by any allegations of fact. They complain of "stoppages, interruptions and interference" but there is nothing to justify such charges. In truth it appears on the face of complaint that the ordinance establishing the number of taxicabs for Chicago was enacted subsequent to extensive public hearings as to public convenience and necessity (R. 11, 18-26). The inconsistency of petitioners' position is best demonstrated by their allegation in their complaint to the effect that the public hearings as to the need for increased taxicab service "considered the City of Chicago taxicab situation alone and not that of the Chicago Metropolitan Area, and took place at a time in which the scheduled airlines used Chicago Midway Airport primarily" (R. 11). Petitioners themselves disprove this allegation in their complaint by attaching to their complaint the report arising out of the public hearings which found (R. 22):

> "Chicago *and its metropolitan area* * * * has the second largest concentration of people in the United States. The area continues to show a rapid growth in population." (Emphasis supplied.)

The report continues by showing that (R. 23): "The Northwest Expressway, scheduled for completion in the summer of 1960, will provide O'Hare Airport passengers with a high-speed, limited access highway into the heart of the City" and estimates (R. 23, 24):

> "The number of enplaned passengers at O'Hare Airport increased from 336,000 [in] 1956 to 603,000 in 1958 and it is estimated that the number of enplaned passengers will approximate 750,000 in 1959 and [6,820,000] in the year of 1965."

Ordinance Involved.

In addition to the statutes given in the petition, the ordinance adopted by the City of Chicago on March 9, 1962 is essential to the issues in this cause. The ordinance is attached hereto as an Appendix.

Statement.

Rule 40(3) provides that respondents' brief need not contain a statement of the case. However in the case at bar we consider it necessary to provide our own statement because petitioners have failed to state the facts in their proper perspective. Rather, petitioners have implied a set of facts contrary to what actually occurred.

The gist of the complaint in the court below was the allegation that on January 23, 1962 the respondents City of Chicago and its officials attended a so-called "secret meeting" with representatives of taxicab companies licensed by the City where they "combined, confederated, conspired and agreed" to eliminate and restrict competition in providing taxicab service at the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport (R. 11, 12). Proof of the conspiracy was charged to be found in the ordinance enacted March 9, 1962 (R. 12), which was attached to the complaint as Exhibit B and which was set out *in haec verba* in the Appendix filed in the court below (R. 26-31). Petitioners refer to the so-called "secret meeting" as though some fell purpose was arranged at a clandestine meeting. Yet, this ordinance, the gravamen of petitioners' complaint, is not referred to in the petition for certiorari as being one of the statutes involved, nor is it set forth as an appendix to the petition.

In truth, the "secret meeting" to which petitioners refer was a meeting of responsible city officials with representa-

tives of all taxicab companies licensed by the city. The city's corporation counsel, its public vehicle license commissioner, an aide to the mayor and a member of the police department conferred with representatives of Yellow Cab Company, Checker Taxi Co., Inc., Public Taxi Service, Inc., Abernathy Taxi Association, South Side Cab Company, Highland Cab Company, Inc., Commercial Cab Company, Bertel W. Daigre, American United Cab Association, Jack Taylor and Pete Barbero. What was the reason for the conference? The purpose of the meeting and what transpired there is best determined by the ordinance of March 9, 1962 which grew out of the meeting.

As alleged in petitioners' complaint, the City of Chicago took over the Airport in 1956 (R. 8) and since said date it has been developed into the world's busiest airport due in no small measure to millions of dollars invested in construction and improvement. However, the taxicab companies which were licensed by the city did not service the airport as circumstances required. Further, rates established by the city for taxicab service were only applicable to trips within the city and had no binding effect for trips to areas outside the city. These conditions necessitated immediate correction and such was the purpose of what petitioners term the "secret meeting."

The ordinance which petitioners attacked in the court below—but which they scarcely mention here—is attached to our brief as an appendix. It was adopted March 9, 1962 (Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of Chicago, March 9, 1962, pp. 6882-6885) and accomplished twin objectives. One, it made it unlawful for the driver of any taxicab to refuse any person transportation from O'Hare Airport. Two, it provided that taxicab drivers must service the airport by transporting persons to suburban areas at prescribed maximum rates. This was the result of the "secret meeting." This is the ordinance of which peti-

tioners complain. This is the basis of petitioners' contention that the City of Chicago and its officials have violated Federal Anti-Trust Statutes for which they should respond in damages to petitioners. On the contrary, the City contends that the end result of the March 9, 1962, ordinance was an improvement in taxicab service for persons arriving at O'Hare Airport and stringent measures to prevent excessive fares.

The Chicago ordinances regulating the operation of taxicabs have always prohibited the transportation of passengers for hire by unlicensed taxicabs, although suburban taxicabs could always enter the city for the purpose of discharging passengers accepted for transportation outside the city. When suburban taxicabs have discharged a passenger accepted for transportation outside the city, they are not permitted to accept or solicit passengers. This requirement has been in effect for many years. Presumably, the municipalities in which petitioners are licensed to operate have similar ordinances. Most assuredly, if Chicago's taxicabs were authorized to operate within petitioners' municipalities in competition with petitioners' taxicabs chaos would result. For some reason, petitioners have directed their attack upon taxicab operations at O'Hare Airport although their arguments, if sound, would have equal application to railroad depots in Chicago's central areas or to taxicab operations anywhere within the city.

ARGUMENT.

Insofar as these respondents are concerned there is no justification whatsoever for this suit. The city and its officials, acting in the public interest, conferred with licensed taxicab companies and then enacted an ordinance (1) requiring the companies to service O'Hare Airport and (2) establishing maximum fares that the companies could assess for suburban trips. That is the only thing these respondents have done. Because of this the petitioners are asking this Court to compel these respondents to pay enormous sums of money for a supposed violation of Federal Antitrust Statutes.

I.

The business of the respondent taxicab companies is not in interstate commerce.

Although we have already demonstrated that these respondents have not violated any provisions of the antitrust statutes and are not liable to petitioners, there are other reasons why petitioners' suit was properly dismissed.

Taxicab service provided locally for those arriving at or departing from an airport does not have a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce so that federal antitrust jurisdiction may be invoked. In fact, petitioners concede that local taxicab business has been held by this Court not to be sufficiently related to interstate commerce so as to come within the provisions of the several antitrust acts. *United States* v. *Yellow Cab Co.*, 332 U. S. 218 (1947). See also *United States* v. *Yellow Cab Co.*, 338 U. S. 338 (1949). The latter decision is directly in point and controlling as the Court below held.

Petitioners rely upon cases not related to the facts in the case at bar as authority for their position. However, the court below effectively answered such contention and discussed and distinguished the cases upon which petitioners rely. The courts have consistently required that in order for federal antitrust jurisdiction to be sustained the effect on interstate commerce must be direct and substantial and not merely inconsequential, remote or fortuitous. *Cf. Page v. Work*, 290 F. 2d 323, 332 (9th Cir., 1961); *Atlantic Co., v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co.*, 178 F. 2d 453, 457, 458 (5th Cir., 1949), *cert. den.* 339 U. S. 953. See, also, *Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeyman Barbers, etc.*, 301 F. 2d 443 (8th Cir., 1962); *Lawson v. Woodmere*, 217 F. 2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954); *Spears Free Clinic and Hospital v. Cleere*, 197 F. 2d 125, 127 (10th Cir., 1952).

Assuming, *arguendo*, that any monopolistic tendencies resulted from the enactment of the ordinances the courts have generally upheld the validity of ordinances as against an objection based upon the alleged monopolistic tendency or effect of the ordinance (see Anno. 159 A.L.R. 821-827 following *North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. North Little Rock*, 207 Ark. 976, 184 S. W. 2d 52, 159 A.L.R. 813 (1944).

In *Capitol Taxicab Co. v. Cermak*, 60 F. 2d 608 (D. C. Ill. 1932), the court said of a similar ordinance (p. 612):

> "To the argument that the ordinance tends to create a monopoly, it is sufficient answer that the city has not by its legislation surrendered its right to grant other and further certificates to all other applicants. It may still grant applications, and undoubtedly adequate remedy exists against affirmative exercise of arbitrary authority in that respect."

Because the taxicab ordinance does not infringe on interstate commerce, the acts of the city and its officials do not fall within the provisions of the several antitrust acts.

II.

An ordinance lawfully adopted by a municipality regulating and licensing taxicabs which operate within the city cannot serve as the basis of an antitrust action against the municipality and its officials.

The City of Chicago is empowered by law to license, tax, regulate and prohibit taxicabs (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, pars. 11-42-4, 11-42-6), to regulate the use of streets and traffic thereon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, pars. 11-80-2, 11-80-20) and to adopt such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect such powers (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 24, par. 1-2-1). Regulatory ordinances enacted pursuant to such statutory powers have been sustained by the courts: *Weksler v. Collins*, 317 Ill. 132, 147 N. E. 797, *error disc.* 273 U. S. 779 (1925); *The People ex rel Johns v. Thompson*, 341 Ill. 166, 173 N. E. 137 (1930); *City of Decatur v. Chasteen*, 19 Ill. 2d 204, 166 N. E. 2d 29 (1960).

The City of Chicago has consistently exercised its powers under the foregoing statutory provisions and has adopted ordinances regulating the operation of taxicabs within the city. Ordinances so adopted have always contained provisions prohibiting the operation of unlicensed taxicabs within the city and providing that suburban taxicabs may bring passengers into the city. (*Cf.* Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of Chicago, December 20, 1951, pp. 1595-1600). The most recent regulatory ordinance was adopted August 24, 1959 (effective January 1, 1960) after extensive public hearings as to the necessity for additional taxical service. (*See Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago*, 23 Ill. 2d 453, 178 N. E. 2d 330 (1961)). The latter ordinance contained the usual provisions as to interurban operations. This ordinance, similar to all prior ordinances,

prohibited the operation of public passenger vehicles within the city unless licensed by the city, but permitted suburban vehicles to enter the city for the purpose of discharging passengers. Thereafter, such unlicensed vehicles were required to leave the city without soliciting or accepting passengers. This standard provision has been in effect for many years prior to the adoption of the 1959 ordinance.

The courts have rejected contentions that the ordinances create a monopoly. *Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago*, 396 Ill. 388, 399, 71 N. E. 2d 652 (1947); *People ex rel. Hafer v. Flynn*, 13 Ill. 2d 368, 379, 150 N. E. 2d 183 (1958). In *Olsen v. The City of Chicago*, 25 Ill. 2d 292, 184 N. E. 2d 879 (1962), the Illinois Supreme Court considered an attack by suburban taxicab drivers on the city's authority to regulate the operation of taxicabs at O'Hare Airport and upheld the identical ordinances here being considered saying (25 Ill. 2d at 295):

> "They do not seek authority to pick up only passengers going to the municipalities in which they are respectively licensed to operate. Indeed, they do not suggest that the three very small municipalities that are named as having issued taxicab licenses to them are responsible for an appreciable, or even a measurable fraction of the total taxicab business originating at the airport. What the plaintiffs seek is authority to solicit and pick up passengers going from the airport to any suburban municipality. In other words, they insist upon the right to pick up passengers in one municipality in which they have no license to operate, and to carry those passengers to other municipalities in which they have no license to operate."

This is precisely what petitioners seek in the case at bar.

Furthermore, the various antitrust statutes are inapplicable to the facts in the case at bar, for we are here

concerned with legislative action. In *Parker v. Brown*, 317 U. S. 341 (1943) the Court said (pp. 350, 351):

> "But it is plain that the [] program here was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command. We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."

So, in the case at bar, these respondents, the City and its officials should not be held to respond in damages for engaging in activities directed by its legislature. This was their duty.

III.

Discussion of proposed legislation does not constitute a conspiracy to violate antitrust laws.

Petitioners charged that the respondents conspired together to eliminate and restrict competition in taxicab service at O'Hare Airport as a result of which the ordinance complained of was enacted (R. 11, 12). The ordinance of March 9, 1962, shows on its face that it was enacted in the best interests of the passengers coming to or departing from the Chicago area via the O'Hare Airport facilities. The ordinance makes it mandatory that taxicabs licensed by the City provide adequate service at the airport. The ordinance makes it mandatory that only a prescribed fare be charged for trips to the various sur-

rounding communities, a departure from past practices of overcharging.

If, in fact, there was an illegal agreement as plaintiffs contend, then, under Illinois law, defendants could be prosecuted and punished (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 121½, pars. 301 *et seq.*). But the supposed activities complained of by petitioners do not constitute an illegal agreement. It appears that a conference was held by city officials and representatives of the various licensed taxicab owners to establish rates of fare for suburban trips. The establishment of rates of fare for suburban trips makes it clear that the licensed taxicabs were required to provide adequate service. The ordinance also established the right of petitioners and others similarly situated to accept passengers at O'Hare Airport if such was the desire of the passengers.

The law is well established that it is not illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors. *Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference* v. *Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U. S. 127 (1961). Further, joint efforts to influence legislative and administrative action for the purpose of destroying or restricting competition does not violate the law. *Association of Western Rys.* v. * Riss & Co.*, 299 F. 2d 133 (D. C. Cir., 1962), *cert. den.* 370 U. S. 916. Thus, the taxicab respondents are not subject to antitrust action because of any attempt they made, if any, to influence legislation. Further, an analysis of the March 9, 1962 ordinance leads to the conclusion that the taxicab respondents did not receive any advantages therefrom that they did not previously possess. Indeed, they are worse off under the present ordinance than they were under the previous taxicab ordinance.

As to the City and its officials, there was certainly no

agreement to seek action on laws in the hope that it would constitute an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors. The City has no competitors as it is not engaged in the taxicab business. The City and its officials made no attempt to bring about an advantage for one group over another. These respondents, in proposing, discussing, and enacting legislation are only motivated by the best interests of the people of the City.

IV.

The provisions of the Chicago ordinance requiring corporations to have a place of business within the municipality are valid and a reasonable exercise of the police power.

Petitioners challenge the validity of those provisions of the Chicago ordinances which require a corporate applicant for a taxicab license to have its principal place of business in the city. This precise issue is not clearly presented in the record. In their complaint petitioners employ a shotgun attack by charging (R. 12, 13):

> "Said ordinance [the ordinance of March 9, 1962 which required taxicabs to service O'Hare Airport and which established maximum fares for travel to suburban areas] and the other Chicago Taxicab ordinances * * * which limit the [petitioners] in providing taxi service at O'Hare, are under the circumstances set forth above wholly unreasonable, discriminatory and deprive the [petitioners] of their property without due process of law contrary to the XIVth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."

The "circumstances set forth above" in petitioners' complaint relate to the supposed violations of antitrust statutes. Nowhere in the complaint do petitioners assert that the Chicago ordinances are unconstitutional because they

violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the XIVth Amendment in requiring corporate applicants to have their principal place of business in the city. All we have is a vague, general charge that would be applicable to almost any situation.

The "other Chicago Taxicab ordinances" referred to in the complaint are (1) the ordinance effective January 1, 1960 increasing the number of taxicabs to 4600 (R. 32, 33); (2) the ordinance establishing the office of public vehicle license commissioner and prescribing his powers and duties (R. [illegible]); the ordinance regulating taxicabs (R. 35-57); the ordinance regulating chauffeurs (R. 57-63); and the ordinance providing for the registration of school vehicles (R. 63-67). In their petition in this Court petitioners provide a paragraph giving the statutes involved (Petition, p. 3); omit completely the ordinance of March 9, 1962 and rely only upon a few of the sections of the ordinance regulating taxicabs (Petition App. 15-19). All of the other ordinances and the bulk of the taxicab ordinance relied upon in the complaint are absent.

In the prayer to their complaint, petitioners seek monetary damages and injunctive relief, but they do not ask the Court to strike down the ordinances involved as being unconstitutional (R. 14-16).

Even though petitioners have failed to present a specific attack, their position asserted here is unsound. The court below effectively answered such arguments relying upon *City of Chicago* v. *Yokes*, 28 Ill. 2d 475, 193 N. E. 2d 4 (1963). To the same effect is *Larson* v. *City of Rockford*, 371 Ill. 441, 21 N. E. 2d 396 (1939) which petitioners cite as though it sustains their position (Petition, pp. 20, 21), although petitioners conclude by stating that the *Larson* case upon which they presumably rely is "far different" than the ordinance before the Court in the case at bar (Petition, p. 21).

V.

Municipalities and municipal officials are not liable under antitrust laws.

Petitioners have brought this suit against the City of Chicago and, in addition, against the Corporation Counsel of the City, the Public Vehicle License Commissioner, an administrative assistant to the Mayor and a police officer. It is established that municipal officials, in the discharge of their official duties, are not required to respond in damages for any consequences of their actions or decisions. *Wise v. City of Chicago*, 308 F. 2d 364 (7th Cir., 1962), *cert. den.* 372 U. S. 944; *Kostal v. Stoner*, 292 F. 2d 492, 493 (10th Cir., 1961); *Stitt v. Lynch*, 267 F. 2d 237, 239 (7th Cir., 1959); *Laughlin v. Rosenman*, 161 F. 2d 838, 841, 842 (D. C. Cir., 1947); *Peckham v. Scanlon*, 241 F. 2d 761, 763 (7th Cir., 1957); *Rhodes v. Houston*, 202 F. Supp. 624, 633, 634 (D. C. Neb. 1962); *Thompson v. Evans*, 49 Ill. App. 289 (1892); *Martelli v. Pollock*, 162 Cal. App. 2d 655, 328 P. 2d 795, 798 (1958).

There is nothing in the record of this case which indicates any basis for a suit for damages against such municipal officials. The court below properly held that the suit should have been dismissed as to the municipality and the municipal officials. As to the City of Chicago, it is submitted that it was not the intention of Congress to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of antitrust statutes. *Monroe v. Pape*, 365 U. S. 167, 187-192 (1961).

Conclusion.

We have demonstrated that the decision of the court below is clearly correct, that there is no conflict of decision which should persuade this Court to grant certiorari and that there is no important question of Federal law for the Court to consider.

For the foregoing reasons it is respectfully submitted that the petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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Of Counsel.

APPENDIX

Ordinance adopted March 9, 1962 by the City Council of the City of Chicago (Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, March 9, 1962, pp. 6882-6885).

Be It Ordained by the City Council of the City of Chicago:

SECTION 1. Section 28.9.1 of the Municipal Code of Chicago as amended is amended by striking out the words "a natural person" appearing in the third sentence thereof and substituting therefor the following words: "a person or corporation".

SECTION 2. Section 28.28 of the Municipal Code of Chicago as amended is amended by adding the following paragraphs:

Every driver of a taxicab licensed by the City of Chicago as a public passenger vehicle, who upon the premises of the Chicago O'Hare International Airport and not otherwise engaged in the transportation of a person or persons, shall service said airport by transporting, when requested, any person from said airport to any listed suburb of the City of Chicago and the driver shall not charge more than the established rate of transportation to such listed suburb as is established herein by a schedule rate of maximum fare to and as posted at the terminal buildings of said airport. It shall be unlawful for a driver of a taxicab to refuse any person transportation from said airport. It shall be unlawful for any driver of any taxicab not licensed as such by the City of Chicago to solicit or engage in the transportation of any person upon the Chicago O'Hare International Airport for transportation within or without the City of Chicago; provided, however, that this provision shall not apply where the person

at said airport desiring other taxicab service has personally or through his agent previously by letter, telegram, or telephone specifically engaged a suburban taxicab to transport him to any of the suburbs of the City of Chicago.

Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit any public passenger vehicle from entering Chicago-O'Hare International Airport to discharge passengers previously accepted outside the city for that purpose.

SECTION 3. The following schedule of taxicab rates of maximum fare shall be effective from the Chicago-O'Hare International Airport to the address directed by the passenger to the respective suburb listed herein:

Miles	*Town*	*Rate*
11	Addison	$ 4.40
66	Alden	26.40
31	Alsip	12.40
29	Algonquin	11.60
45	Antioch	18.00
21	Argo	8.40
25	Argonne Lab.	10.00
13	Arlington Track	5.20
12	Arlington Heights	4.80
38	Aurora	15.20
18	Bannockburn	7.20
23	Barrington	9.20
23	Barrington Hills	9.20
21	Bartlett	8.40
32	Batavia	12.80
22	Bedford Park	8.80
9	Bellwood	3.60
7	Bensenville	2.80
10	Berkeley	4.00
16	Berwyn	6.40
16	Bloomingdale	6.40
34	Blue Island	13.60
21	Bridgeview	8.40
12	Broadview	4.80
15	Brookfield	6.00

Miles	*Town*	*Rate*
16	Buffalo Grove	6.40
49	Burnham	19.60
47	Calumet City	18.80
35	Calumet Park	14.00
21	Carol Stream	8.40
29	Carpentersville	11.60
29	Cary	11.60
48	Channel Lake	19.20
45	Chicago Heights	18.00
28	Chicago Ridge	11.20
19	Cicero	7.60
18	Clarendon Hills	7.20
19	Cloverdale	7.60
38	Country Club Hills	15.20
37	Crestwood	14.80
50	Crete	20.00
35	Crystal Lake	14.00
26	Cuba	10.40
17	Deerfield	6.80
21	Deer Park	8.40
5	Des Plaines	2.00
26	Diamond Lake	10.40
36	Dixmoor	14.40
39	Dolton	15.60
22	Downers Grove	8.80
28	Dundee	11.20
48	E. Chicago Heights	19.20
27	Elgin	10.80
8	Elk Grove Village	3.20
12	Elmhurst	4.80
9	Elmwood Park	3.60
15	Evanston	6.00
31	Evergreen Park	12.40
42	Flossmoor	16.80
14	Forest Park	5.60
18	Forest View	7.20
23	Fort Sheridan	9.20
44	Fox Lake	17.60
28	Fox River Grove	11.20
29	Fox River Heights	11.60

Miles	*Town*	*Rate*
48	Frankfort	19.20
6	Franklin Park	2.40
32	Geneva	12.80
32	Gilberts	12.80
23	Glencoe	9.20
17	Glendale	6.80
45	Glenwood	18.00
20	Glen Ellyn	8.00
12	Glenview	4.80
12	Golf	4.80
36	Gray's Lake	14.40
29	Great Lakes	11.60
31	Gurnee	12.40
37	Hainesville	14.80
21	Half Day	8.40
19	Hanover Park	7.60
20	Harvester	8.00
41	Harvey	16.40
6	Harwood Heights	2.40
25	Hawthorne Woods	10.00
41	Hazelcrest	16.40
26	Hickory Hills	10.40
19	Highland Park	7.60
23	Highwood	9.20
10	Hillside	4.00
14	Hines Hospital	5.60
17	Hinsdale	6.80
17	Hodgkins	6.80
14	Hoffman Estates	5.60
30	Hometown	12.00
40	Homewood	16.00
21	Hubbard Woods	8.40
23	Indian Creek	9.20
20	Indian Head Park	8.00
32	Island Lake	12.80
10	Itasca	4.00
40	Joliet	16.00
19	Justice	7.60
70	Kankakee	28.00
20	Kenilworth	8.00

Miles	*Town*	*Rate*
21	Kildeer	8.40
14	LaGrange	5.60
13	LaGrange Park	5.20
28	Lake Barrington	11.20
27	Lake Bluff	10.80
24	Lake Forest	9.60
31	Lake in the Hills	12.40
37	Lakemoor	14.80
40	Lake Villa	16.00
36	Lakewood	14.40
24	Lake Zurich	9.60
45	Lansing	18.00
28	Lemont	11.20
27	Libertyville	10.80
40	Lily-Cache	16.00
20	Lincolnshire	8.00
11	Lincolnwood	4.40
24	Lisle	9.60
36	Lindenhurst	14.40
37	Lockport	14.80
15	Lombard	6.00
41	Long Lake	16.40
20	Long Grove	8.00
42	Loon Lake	16.80
49	Lynwood	19.60
16	McCook	6.40
42	McCullum Lake	16.80
40	McHenry	16.00
63	Manteno	25.20
37	Markham	14.80
45	Matteson	18.00
11	Maywood	4.40
12	Medinah	4.80
8	Melrose Park	3.20
34	Merrionette Park	13.60
22	Mettawa	8.80
35	Midlothian	14.00
26	Middlebury	10.40
50	Minooka	20.00
42	Mokena	16.80

Miles	*Town*	*Rate*
48	Monee	19.20
39	Montgomery	15.60
37	Mooseheart	14.80
13	Morton Grove	5.20
9	Mt. Prospect	3.60
28	Mundelein	11.20
27	Naperville	10.80
54	New Lenox	21.60
8	Niles	3.20
6	Norridge	2.40
36	North Aurora	14.40
17	Northbrook	6.80
30	North Chicago	12.00
15	Northfield	6.00
8	Northlake	3.20
15	N. Riverside	6.00
35	Oak Forest	14.00
26	Oak Grove	10.40
14	Oakbrook	5.60
15	Oakbrook Terrace	6.00
35	Oak Forest	14.00
29	Oak Lawn	11.60
36	Old Mill Creek	14.40
13	Oak Park	5.20
44	Olympia Fields	17.60
34	Orland Park	13.60
42	Oswego	16.80
16	Palatine	6.40
29	Palos Heights	11.60
28	Palos Hills	11.20
30	Palos Park	12.00
29	Park City	11.60
6	Park Ridge	2.40
45	Park Forest	18.00
54	Peotone	21.60
43	Phoenix	17.20
38	Plainfield	15.20
36	Posen	14.40
57	Richmond	22.80
46	Richton Park	18.40
37	Riverdale	14.80

Miles	Town	Rate
17	Riverwoods	6.80
11	River Forest	4.40
8	River Grove	3.20
16	Riverside	6.40
34	Robbins	13.60
42	Rockdale	16.80
13	Rolling Meadows	5.20
32	Romeoville	12.80
14	Roselle	5.60
3	Rosemont	1.20
39	Round Lake	15.60
38	Round Lake Beach	15.20
41	Round Lake Park	16.40
25	Roundout	10.00
50	Sauk Village	20.00
15	Schaumburg	6.00
45	Shorewood	18.00
30	Sleepy Hollow	12.00
48	Spring Grove	19.20
30	St. Charles	12.00
20	Streamwood	8.00
4	Schiller Park	1.60
13	Skokie	5.20
59	Sollit	23.60
47	S. Chicago Heights	18.80
32	S. Elgin	12.80
44	S. Holland	17.60
24	Spaulding	9.60
48	Steger	19.20
18	Stickney	7.20
7	Stone Park	2.80
18	Summit (Cook Cty)	7.20
47	Sunnyside	18.80
16	Techny	6.40
43	Thornton	17.20
35	Tinley Park	14.00
29	Valley View	11.60
37	Venetian Village	14.80
23	Vernon Hills	9.20
14	Villa Park	5.60
35	Volo	14.00

Miles	*Town*	*Rate*
36	Wadsworth	14.40
27	Warrenville	10.80
36	Washington Park	14.40
30	Wauconda	12.00
34	Waukegan	13.60
26	Wayne	10.40
10	Westchester	4.00
28	West Chicago	11.20
15	Western Springs	6.00
21	W. Lake Forest	8.40
20	Westmont	8.00
22	Wheaton	8.80
14	Wheeling	5.60
20	Willow Brook	8.00
20	Willow Springs	8.00
19	Wilmette	7.60
29	Wilson	11.60
25	Winfield	10.00
20	Winnetka	8.00
46	Winthrop Harbor	18.40
43	Wonder Lake	18.00
8	Wood Dale	3.20
28	Woodridge	11.20
28	Worth	11.20
44	Woodstock	17.60
45	Zion	18.00

For each extra passenger a charge of $0.20 shall be charged.

When toll roads are used the toll charges to and from the destination shall be added to the fare.

Transportation of any person to any suburb or unincorporated area, not included in said schedule of rates, shall be at a maximum rate of $0.40 per mile.

Every passenger under twelve years of age when accompanied by an adult shall be carried without charge.

SECTION 4. This ordinance shall take effect upon passage and publication.